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Abstract
Populism and technocracy reject vertical accountability and horizontal accountability. Populism and technocracy can com-
bine to form ‘technocratic populism.’ The study assesses the extent to which democratic decay can be traced to the actions
of technocratic populists as opposed to institutional factors, civil society, fragmentation and polarization. The main find-
ings of this article are that technocratic populism has illiberal tendencies expressed best in its efforts at executive aggran-
dizement (cf. Bermeo, 2016). Without an effective bulwark against democratic erosion (cf. Bernhard, 2015), technocratic
populism tends to undermine electoral competition (vertical accountability), judiciary independence, legislative oversight
(horizontal accountability), and freedom of the press (diagonal accountability). The most effective checks on technocratic
populist in power, this study finds, are the courts, free media, and civil society. This article highlights the mechanisms of
democratic decay and democratic resilience beyond electoral politics. It indicates that a combination of institutional veto
points and civil society agency is necessary to prevent democratic erosion (cf. Weyland, 2020). While active civil society
can prevent democratic erosion, it cannot reverse it. Ultimately, the future of liberal democracy depends on the people’s
willingness to defend it in the streets AND at the ballot box.
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1. Introduction
Populism and technocracy have emerged as two impor-
tant critiques of representative democracy (Caramani,
2017; Urbinati, 2014). Populism pledges to reinstall the
(previously excluded) people at the center of democ-
racy by restoring responsiveness (Kaltwasser, 2014).
Technocracy promises to rescue democracy with knowl-
edge, competence and effectiveness, producing ‘opti-
mal outcomes’ and restoring responsibility (Caramani,
2017; Urbinati, 2014). The critical element of technocrat-
ic legitimacy is output—it claims its outcomes driven by
experts are superior to ’non-experts.’ As such, technoc-
racy is plebiscitarian by nature and has profound con-
flicts with liberal democracy as well as with populism
(cf. Urbinati, 2014).
Notwithstanding these tensions, populism and tech-
nocracy share a common enemy—representative party
politics (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017; Caramani, 2017)—
and aim to significantly redefine the notion of democra-
cy. Both rely on a non-pluralist conception of society, the
existence of a unified general interest, and an unmedi-
ated relationship between the people and the elite.
Populism and technocracy therefore reject both verti-
cal accountability—for populism, vertical accountability
is ‘self-sanctioning’; for technocracy, vertical accountabil-
ity is ‘impossible’—and horizontal accountability, which
is seen as a source of ‘procedural constraints for the gen-
eral interests of society’ (Caramani, 2017, pp. 60–61).
Given these similarities, populism and technocracy
can combine to form ‘technocratic populism’ (Buštíková
& Guasti, 2019; de la Torre, 2013; Havlík, 2019), the
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theme of this special issue. This study focuses on three
aspects of technocratic populism: 1) attempts among
populists in power to undermine accountability; 2) their
influence on democratic decay; and 3) their failures
(when the institutional guardrails and civil society suc-
cessfully oppose these attempts (cf. Caramani, 2017;
Weyland, 2020).
It builds on the literature examining the ambiva-
lent relationship between populism and democracy
(Kaltwasser, 2012, 2014; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014;
Weyland, 2020), the negative impact of technocracy and
populism on accountability (Caramani, 2017) and its dele-
terious influence on democracy (Ruth, 2018; Ruth-Lovell,
Lührmann, & Grahn, 2019). It advances the literature
on how technocratic populism undermines democratic
accountability by: 1) distorting the system of checks and
balances (horizontal accountability); 2) limiting electoral
competition (vertical accountability); and 3) undermin-
ing media freedom, and constraining civil society (diag-
onal accountability; cf. Bernhard, Hicken, Reenock, &
Lindberg, 2020).
Accountability is defined here as a constraint on
the use of power (Lindberg, 2013)—conceptually dis-
tinct from responsibility, responsiveness, and repre-
sentation (Lührmann, Marquardt, & Mechkova, 2017;
Mechkova, Lührmann, & Lindberg, 2019). Using three
V-DEM composite indices—horizontal, vertical, and diag-
onal accountability—and additional qualitative observa-
tion, this article highlights the erosion of all three types
of accountability over time (from 2013 until 2019).
This study assesses the extent to which democratic
decay can be traced to the actions of technocratic pop-
ulists as opposed to institutional factors (electoral sys-
tem, bicameralism), civil society (protests), fragmenta-
tion and polarization (cf. Weyland, 2020). It provides new
insights about the threat of technocratic populism when
technocratic populists are in power in a relatively new
democracy—the Czech Republic.
Newer democracies have weaker institutional safe-
guards and civil society resilience to withstand the
(potential) democratic decay caused by technocratic pop-
ulists’ attack on accountability (cf. Bernhard, Hicken,
Reenock, & Lindberg, 2015; Weyland, 2020). The main
findings indicate that, if left unchecked, technocrat-
ic populism undermines electoral competition (vertical
accountability), judiciary independence, legislative over-
sight (horizontal accountability), and freedom of the
press (diagonal accountability). Further, the study shows
that the most effective check on technocratic populist
in power are courts, free media, and civil society, which
form an effective bulwark against democratic erosion
(cf. Bernhard, 2015; Weyland, 2020).
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 explores
technocracy, populism, and technocratic populism as dis-
figurations of liberal democracy. In Section 3, data and
methods are outlined, and the three types of account-
ability are operationalized. Section 4 examines techno-
cratic populism’s effects on three types of accountability
and Section 5 emphasizes the erosion of accountability
during the Covid-19 pandemic. In conclusion, the article
highlights how technocratic populism has undermined
democratic accountability and led to democratic decay,
but also how courts, independent media, and civil soci-
ety can be an effective bulwark against democratic decay
and a source of democratic resilience (Bernhard, 2020;
Weyland, 2020).
2. Democratic Disfigurations and Democratic Decay
While two disfigurations are vital for understand-
ing democratic decay—technocracy and populism
(Bickerton & Accetti, 2017; Caramani, 2017; Urbinati,
2014)—these forms of politics have sometimes had an
antagonist relationship. This is hardly surprising, since
each seeks a profoundly different goal. Populism promis-
es to restore the power of the people. Technocracy
seeks to shift power to the experts (Caramani, 2017).
For populism, the will of the majority equals the will of
the people—monolithic and hegemonic (Laclau, 2005).
For technocracy, people are an abstract entity unable
to govern, and popular sovereignty can be fulfilled
effectively only by impartial experts driven by reason
(Rosanvallon, 2011).
At the same time, populism and technocracy share a
proceduralist view of democracy (democracy is reduced
to a procedure for selecting the leader). They also share
several important features: Both reject ‘mediated pol-
itics’ and see themselves as anti-political (Bickerton &
Accetti, 2017; Rosanvallon, 2011; Taggart, 2002). While
left- and right-wing populisms both have ideological
agendas, the ‘marriage’ of populism with technocracy
regards the ‘left/right’ dimension of political competi-
tion as obsolete (cf. Caramani, 2017, on the opposition
of technocratic populism to traditional party democra-
cy). Democratic procedures are mere ‘approximations’
(Rosanvallon, 2011) and ‘formalisms’ (Laclau, 2005).
Technocratic populism is more than the sum of the
two parts, however. Technocratic populism asks people
to place the power into the hands of the populist leader
who will run the state competently (Buštíková & Guasti,
2019). The leader will embody the people and act on
their behalf (Laclau, 2005). In a technocratic social con-
tract, the people become spectators of the new political
elite—expert technocrats adopting solutions that ben-
efit the ‘ordinary people’ (Manin, 1997, on audience
democracy; cf. Urbinati, 2014, on plebiscitarianism as a
form of the populist disfiguration of democracy).
Once technocratic populists attain power, they want
the people to believe in their numbers, enjoy their ‘nor-
mal life,’ and let the experts’ rule. Here an important
caveat, technocratic populism and technocratic rule have
a similar root but are not identical (Buštíková & Guasti,
2019; Pastorella, 2016). Technocratic populism uses the
ideology of numbers and the ideology of expert knowl-
edge to appeal directly to the voters using anti-elite, pop-
ulist rhetoric (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). The state is
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seen like a firm, where there is no place for active citi-
zens or civil society between elections. The populist ele-
ment of technocratic populism weakens checks and bal-
ances, especially institutional safeguards (minority pro-
tection), facilitates the centralization of power, reduces
the diversity of the public forum and transforms politi-
cal opposition into the enemy of the people (Ruth-Lovell
et al., 2019). The technocratic element narrows politi-
cal competition and eliminates democratic accountabil-
ity (Caramani, 2017; Urbinati, 2014); the populist ele-
ment portrays the opposition as the enemy of the (ordi-
nary) people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018), rather than a
legitimate political adversary.
Once in power, and unconstrained by the need for
ideological consistency, technocratic populists are free
to adopt policies that maintain voter support, for exam-
ple, by combining inconsistent redistributive and pro-
market policies (Buštíková & Baboš, 2020). In the absence
of ideology, technocracy provides an alternative legiti-
mation framework—materially-based output legitimacy
(Buštíková & Baboš, 2020). Technocratic governments
increase pressure on domestic political actors, weaken
partisan ideology-based politics and loosen accountabil-
ity ties (cf. Pastorella, 2016). Executive aggrandizement,
which undermines checks and balances in the name of
the people (Bermeo, 2016), is the most common form of
democratic decay. Democratic institutions are bypassed,
transparency reduced, oversight and deliberation are
minimized. The source of decay originates in excluding
pluralistic voices from debates along with restrictions on
political opponents and peaceful civil society (Bernhard,
2020; Vachudova, 2019).
Finally, the rise of populism and technocracy can
also trigger liberal pushback, whose strength determines
the degree of democratic resilience in the face of tech-
nocratic populism. Four conditions, I suggest, are nec-
essary for democratic resilience—a free press (critical-
ly assessing information by the government); indepen-
dent courts (ensuring mitigation measures and restric-
tions remain within the constitutional framework), effec-
tive parliamentary opposition (performing government
oversight), and active civil society (mobilizing citizens to
defend democracy; cf. Bernhard, 2020; Weyland, 2020).
2.1. Democratic Decay in Pandemics
The Covid-19 pandemic represented an opportunity
for the populists in government to consolidate pow-
er. During pandemic states of the emergency, core civ-
il rights and civil liberties were suspended. Populist
governments instrumentalized the pandemic restric-
tions to push through policies, laws, regulations, or
hold elections to supervisory boards that would—in
a non-pandemic context—have resulted in backlash
(Guasti, 2020a). Emergency powers also gave populist
leaders the ability to bypass checks and balances. As a
result, the pandemic seems to have accelerated demo-
cratic decay (Guasti, 2020b).
In theory, the resurgence of technocratic expertise
during pandemics should fuel support for technocrat-
ic populism. The unprecedented health crisis requires
expertise—especially epidemiologists and public health
officials. These unelected experts gain a significant
degree of trust, yet remain largely politically unaccount-
able for their advice. The source of decay originates in
populist leaders’ ability to conceal their accountability
behind experts and use technocratic expertise to justify
their efforts to curb freedoms. The source of resilience
is political opposition and civil society’s ability to chal-
lenge technocratic expertise, demand transparency in
the dissemination of facts and data on Covid-19, and
to hold politicians accountable for the types of tech-
nocratic (usually medical) expertise that they choose
to implement.
2.2. Explaining the Erosion of Accountability
We expect to find variations in the erosion of accountabil-
ity caused by technocratic populists, increasing alongside
their growing power:
1) As junior partners in PM Sobotka government
(2013–2017), the power of technocratic pop-
ulists to undermine accountability is limited and
indirect—it cannot undermine the judiciary but
can skew electoral competition.
2) Leading minority PM Babiš government
(2018–2019), the power of technocratic populists
to undermine accountability, especially the judicia-
ry grows, but can be constrained by the parliament
and the civil society.
3) The Covid-19 pandemic (2020) represents a
unique opportunity for further deterioration of
accountability. Emergency measures strengthen
the executive, weaken parliamentary oversight,
and suspend certain rights and liberties (Guasti,
2020b). In this case, the technocratic populists are
least constrained, and the strength and resilience
of the institutional guardrails and civil society are
tested the most (cf. Weyland, 2020). Thus, the
pandemic strengthens the cumulative effect of
previous erosion of accountability.
3. Concept Operationalization
Democratic decay is operationalized as the decline in hor-
izontal, vertical, and diagonal accountability, and demo-
cratic resilience is measured as the improvement/lack of
erosion on one or more accountability types. The change
in accountability is measured by three V-DEM indices
and their components (V-Dem Institute, Department of
Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden):
1) Vertical accountability captures the mechanisms
of formal political participation. The conceptu-
al scheme for the V-DEM vertical accountabili-
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ty index consists of two main aspects: electoral
accountability and political parties (Lührmann
et al., 2017).
2) Horizontal accountability represents the extent to
which state institutions can hold the executive
branch of the government accountable (Lührmann
et al., 2017). Three institutions are essential in
this regard: the legislature, the judiciary, and over-
sight bodies.
3) Diagonal accountability represents the extent to
which citizens can hold government accountable
outside of formal political participation (elections;
Lührmann et al., 2017). V-DEM models this form
of accountability as a function of media freedom,
civil society characteristics, freedom of expression,
and the degree to which citizens are engaged
in politics.
The article supplements the V-DEM accountabili-
ty indices with annual reports for the Sustainable
Governance Indicators by the Bertelsmann Foundation
(Guasti, Mansfeldová, Myant, & Bönker, 2014–2020) to
explain the causes of democratic decay. Where neces-
sary, data are supplemented by primary and secondary
sources. For the Covid-19 analysis, the analysis relies on
primary sources (transcripts of parliamentary debates,
voting records in parliament, official press releases, court
ruling), and on media reporting.
The analysis focuses on the extent to which the ero-
sion of accountability can be traced to the actions of tech-
nocratic populists compared to other factors. It covers
the increasing power of technocratic populists and their
efforts to undermine accountability. The analysis is struc-
tured along the three forms of accountability—vertical,
horizontal and diagonal. Negative change (erosion of
accountability) represents democratic decay, while pos-
itive change (strengthening of accountability), and sta-
tus quo are conceptualized as democratic resilience—
the ability of the institutional guardrails and civil society
to withstand the attempts of technocratic populists to
erode accountability.
4. Democratic Accountability in the Czech Republic
(2013–2019)
4.1. Vertical Accountability
Vertical accountability focuses on two interrelated mech-
anisms of political competition: elections and political
parties. In the Czech Republic, both the 2013 and 2017
elections were deemed free and fair (Guasti et al., 2019;
OSCE, 2017). No cases of vote-buying were reported in
the 2013 and 2017 parliamentary elections. Voter reg-
istration is straightforward; all adult citizens, including
convicted prisoners, can participate in national elections.
There is no voting by mail, which restricts the access of
Czech citizens residing abroad, who can only vote at a
decreasing number of Czech embassies and consulates.
In 2017, voting-counting errors in central Bohemia led to
the first recount in the Czech Republic history.
While the electoral procedures themselves are
sound, campaign finance was an issue until the introduc-
tion of an independent office for the oversight of party
and campaign finance in 2016 (OSCE, 2017). The new law
requires parties (and presidential candidates) to have
transparent accounts subject to monitoring. The law
also establishes limits on donations from a single donor.
Campaign finance has been under closer scrutiny since
2017, but media access remains an issue. During elec-
tions, the Czech electoral law guarantees parties equal
access to state radio and television, irrespective of the
party’s size or past electoral performance. Municipalities
also provide space for billboards, and political advertise-
ments are carried in newspapers. However, there are no
guarantees of access to private media, nor monitoring
of in-kind services (e.g., billboards purchased by a third
party). The dailies of the MAFRA media group, owned by
Andrej Babiš, have been criticized for their political bias
(Jirák & Köpplová, 2020). In both the 2013 and 2017 cam-
paigns, ANO dominated the campaign advertisement
landscape. Unlike other parties, ANO finances are not
dependent on membership contributions or state fund-
ing. Instead, the party has a single benefactor to whom it
owes a significant debt for previous campaigns—the par-
ty Chairman, Andrej Babiš (cf. Buštíková & Guasti, 2019).
Alongside elections, political competition at the
heart of vertical accountability also depends on polit-
ical parties. The Czech party system has been subject
to extreme instability and fragmentation. The previous-
ly stable party system of the 1990s and early 2000s,
when two parties alternated in power (mostly in coalition
governments), became increasingly unstable (Guasti,
2020b). Although overall support for the left and the
right remained stable over time, the shifts in voter sup-
port happened within the two blocks. On the left, ANO
gained the majority of Social Democratic voters and
part of the Communist electoral base. On the fragment-
ed right, the significant shifts occurred between Civic
Democrats and smaller, liberal parties.
The 2013 elections led to a parliament in which
30.5% of its members represented new political par-
ties. In 2017, this number grew to 64%. Fragmentation
doubled between 2010 and 2019—in 2013, seven par-
ties entered parliament; in 2017, it was nine parties.
In 2019, the fragmentation within the parliament further
increased to 10 parties, as a new splinter party Tricolor
(Trikolora), emerged from the Civic Democratic Party.
The instability and fragmentation of the Czech party sys-
tem have made it difficult to form a stable government,
to reach a compromise on pressing issues, but also pre-
vented the Hungarian scenario—a constitutional majori-
ty fueling democratic breakdown (cf. Guasti, 2020b).
Overall, vertical accountability deteriorated in the
Czech Republic between 2013 and 2019, especially
between 2013 and 2017 (Figure 1). To a significant
degree, it is possible to ascribe this decline to ANO
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Figure 1. Vertical accountability 2013–2019. Note: Ordinal scale from 0 to 3, the higher the value the higher the quality of
measured component. Source: Coppedge et al. (2020).
and Andrej Babiš. In the 2013 elections, Andrej Babiš
benefited from unlimited resources, media ownership,
and the absence of campaign finance oversight. While
the PM Sobotka government amended the law on par-
ty finance, the primary source of Babiš’s power rest-
ed in his media ownership. During the government of
PM Sobotka, ANO’s electoral campaign never stopped
(Balík & Hloušek, 2020). The MAFRA media focused on
the successes of ANO ministers and ascribed every mis-
step to the senior partner (Social Democrats) and the PM
(cf. Jirák & Köpplová, 2020). In fact, in 2017, PM Sobotka
left politics and, in 2018, joined the anti-governmental
protests (Guasti, 2020a).
4.2. Horizontal Accountability
Horizontal accountability focuses on the accountabil-
ity of the balance of power—the executive branch
held accountable by the legislature, the judiciary, and
oversight bodies. According to the V-DEM horizon-
tal accountability index, horizontal accountability also
eroded between 2013 and 2017, but not between
2018 and 2019 (Figure 2). A closer look indicates
the main bulwark is the judiciary—the courts remain
independent—and the main weakness is the political
opposition. The fragmented opposition struggles to hold
the executive accountable and investigate its overreach
but has united to prevent executive aggrandizement
(cf. Bermeo, 2016).
The Czech Republic is characterized by a weak gov-
ernment and a fragmented opposition (Guasti, 2020b).
The relative balance of power between the executive
and the legislative branches is because internal divi-
sions have weakened both. Parliamentary oversight is
cumbersome, and its dynamics tenuous. The case of
Lex Babiš during PM Sobotka tenure exemplifies this.
In summer 2016, two of the three governing coalition
partners—Social Democrats and Christian Democrats—
aligned with the parliamentary opposition to amend
the law on conflicts of interest. The law sought to pre-
vent media ownership as well as ownership of compa-
nies receiving state funding. The bill put a significant
wedge between the governing coalition partners, as ANO
and its Chairman Andrej Babiš perceived this to be an
attempt to stall his rise. Not a single ANO parliamen-
tarian supported the bill, which still received a constitu-
tional majority, and in January 2017, Social Democrats,
Christian Democrats, and the parliamentary opposition
overruled the presidential veto. The Constitutional Court
later upheld the law.
PM Babiš often fails to hide his disdain for par-
liamentary oversight (and deliberation), which he per-
ceives as impeding governance. PM Babiš’s government
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Figure 2. Horizontal accountability 2013–2019. Note: Ordinal scale from 0 to 3, the higher the value the higher the quality
of measured component. Source: Coppedge et al. (2020).
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ty and internal divisions (Social democrats are not unit-
ed in their support for governmental bills) than by effec-
tive parliamentary oversight. PM Babiš’s minority gov-
ernment often relies on the opposition Communists to
support its legislation. The support for each piece of
legislation is negotiated individually outside the regular
channels (parliamentary committees) and without over-
sight. Babiš’s government has attempted but failed to
pass some laws that would benefit the PM because the
opposition united against it. This was particularly visible
during the Covid-19 pandemic and will be discussed in
the next section.
Between 2013 and 2017, the party system and its
key players were in turmoil—fragmented, facing new
challengers (including the re-emerged radical right and
the Pirate party) and unable to effectively oppose the
rise of ANO. After the 2017 elections, the opposition
remained fragmented, and ANO has undercut its coali-
tion partner (Social democrats) using informal deals
with the Communists. Between 2013 and 2020, ANO
practically cannibalized the left-side of the political
spectrum. Support for ANO remains stable, but both
Social Democrats and especially the Communists are
now hovering around the 5% threshold. While frag-
mentation undermines oversight, it also has a positive
effect. In combination with the electoral law, it has
prevented ANO from increasing its support above 32%,
thus requiring it to enter into coalition and/or minori-
ty governments.
During Sobotka’s and Babiš’s governments, ANO held
the Ministry of Justice. In both, judiciary reforms were
proposed and failed. The 2016 reform attempt (by Justice
Minister Robert Pelikan) focused mainly on changing the
rules on the selection of judges and preventing candi-
dates without trial experience from entering regional
courts. The reform was opposed by significant figures
within the judiciary who disagreed with the outcome and
the process (lack of continuity and lack of consultation
with the judicial branch). Based on the strong opposition
of the judiciary, tired of ever-changing proposals by every
new Minister of Justice (including the current Minister,
there were 15 in the period from 1993 to 2016), the
reform was postponed indefinitely.
Robert Pelikan was not re-appointed in Babiš’s gov-
ernment. Instead, as the fraud and corruption cases
facing the PM and his family culminated, Andrej Babiš
appointed Marie Benešová as his Minister of Justice.
Before her appointment, Benešová was very vocal in
her (unfounded) accusation that it is possible to “order
police investigations” in the Czech Republic. This was an
overt delegitimization of the investigation of the PM. Her
appointment raised fears of government overreach and
triggered protests. The protests grew even stronger after
Benešová denounced the demonstrators as ignorant and
capricious children.
In her role, Benešová has clashed with the Prosecutor
General, who is in charge of the ongoing investigation
into the PM and his family. In 2019, Benešová introduced
a new judiciary reform, which would shorten the term of
the current Prosecutor General, thus enabling the PM to
nominate a ‘friendlier’ figure. Experts and the judiciary
saw the move as political interference and an attempt
to curtail the judiciary’s independence. Like its 15 prede-
cessors, the reform was dead on arrival—rejected by the
judiciary, the public, and the parliament.
The Constitutional Court exercises the most active
control over executive actions. It is sometimes described
as a ‘utility tool for correcting politics’ (Pospíšil, 2020).
The nomination procedure involving both the President
and the Senate ensures balance in judges’ political views.
The court is fiercely independent, and its judgments have
triggered much controversy across the political spec-
trum (Pospíšil, 2020). While governments clash with the
courts, they also predominantly comply (a recent exam-
ple of a Covid-19 judgment will be discussed in the
next section).
In sum, while the erosion of horizontal account-
ability was an issue during Sobotka’s government, it
was mainly a result of polarization and fragmentation.
An active attempt by the ANO Minister of Justice to cur-
tail PM’s investigation failed. Under Babiš government,
politically motivated judicial reforms also failed, as did
attempts to adopt laws that would resolve PM’s legal
troubles regarding conflicts of interest. The fragmented
opposition is thus capable of uniting to prevent exec-
utive aggrandizement (cf. Bermeo, 2016). The courts
are independent, and the Constitutional Court acts as
a useful corrective (Pospíšil, 2020). Attempts to under-
mine horizontal accountability and the rule of law have
been largely unsuccessful due to a combination of veto
points. Furthermore, the attempts by ANO triggered
large scale protests (Guasti, 2020a). Both institutional
veto points and civil society’s agency prevent democratic
decay (cf. Weyland, 2020).
4.3. Diagonal Accountability
Diagonal accountability focuses on civic participation
and media freedom. Media freedom is crucial in enabling
citizens to hold politicians accountable (Lührmann et al.,
2017; Mechkova et al., 2019). The willingness of citizens
to be engaged in public affairs beyond elections acts as
an essential check on government action and a bulwark
against democratic erosion (Bernhard, 2020). According
to the V-DEM diagonal accountability index, there was
no significant change in diagonal accountability in the
period under study (2013–2019), but a stable decline
since 1990 (Guasti, 2016, 2020b; Jirák & Köpplová, 2020).
A closer look at the two types of components—media
and civic participation (Figure 3)—suggest the media
indicators are in decline, while civic participation criteria
are in flux (cf. Guasti, 2016, 2020b).
Czechia has long been characterized by a significant
degree of media freedom, partly because of the inde-
pendence of public media and foreign ownership of pri-
vate media (cf. Jirák & Köpplová, 2020). However, the
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Figure 3. Diagonal accountability 2013–2019. Note: Ordinal scale from 0 to 3, the higher the value the higher the quality
of measured component. Source: Coppedge et al. (2020).
private media market in Czechia has changed significant-
ly in recent years. The most critical change has been
the concentration of media ownership, the departure
of several foreign media owners, and the broadening
of the scope of media holdings (print, online, radio,
and television). In recent years, print media readership
has declined significantly, while online media has grown
(Jirák & Köpplová, 2020). Projects include crowd-sourced
media outlets, some of which eventually venture into
print (e.g. Dennik N). The concentration of ownership
in the printed media was not as evident in the TV sec-
tor until 2019, when an influential investment compa-
ny PPF owned by Petr Kellner announced its intention
to purchase the U.S. owned Central European Media
Enterprises (CME)—a block its TV channels in the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
Andrej Babiš’s acquisition of MAFRA in 2013 was
integral to his rise to power. It not only transformed
the Czech media landscape but also profoundly skewed
political competition (Chaloupkova, 2020). MAFRA domi-
nates the daily print media, with an estimated 2,4 million
readers, and online media, with an estimated 3,4 million
daily users (Guasti, 2020b). Andrej Babiš has used his
media power to support his political rise and denigrate
any alternatives (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019).
During 2020, information emerged that state-owned
companies such as the Czech railways represent a signifi-
cant advertiser in MAFRA. Furthermore, pandemic state
aid for cultural institutions, announced in June 2020,
will disproportionally benefit MAFRA. The argument of
the government that the aid is being distributed pro-
portionally according to the readership does not hold
water, since the second-largest media group will receive
significantly smaller aid - absolutely and proportionally
(Kottova, 2020).
The V-DEM components identify media bias (in both
2013–2017 and 2018–2019), print and broadcasting
media lacking critical reporting (2013–2017), media cen-
sorship, and self-censorship (2018–2019) as the main
issues undermining media freedom. The Sobotka peri-
od was defined by MAFRA media attacking the PM and
social democratic ministers, while praising Andrej Babiš
and ANO Ministers. Simultaneously, the rise of alterna-
tive online media has contributed to a less biased and
more critical reporting. However, the fight for freedom
of expression has shifted to the fight for the control of
public media and direct and indirect state support for
MAFRA (pandemic state aid, advertisement by state com-
panies; cf. Bátorfy & Urbán, 2020 for a detailed look on
the transformation of the Hungarian media market via
state advertisement).
Moving from media to civic participation beyond
elections, I examine three aspects of an ‘engaged
society’—party membership, civil society, and protests.
According to the V-DEM indicators, the Czech Republic’s
participatory environment remains resilient, although
slightly declining under the PM Babiš (2018–2019).
Societal engagement slightly declined under PM Sobotka
and PM Babiš.
Czech parties have never had a broad member-
ship base (except for the Communist Party, and to
the lesser degree Social Democrats). In the last two
years, the decline in party membership accelerated. The
Communist Party is the largest, with 34,000 members
down from over 100,000 in 2004, almost 70%). Civic
Democrats have lost almost 70% of their membership
since 2009 (now approximately 13,000 members), and
a further decline is expected in connection with the
new splinter party (the Tricolor—radicalized mainstream
right). Christian Democrats lost 35% members in the last
three years (now 22,000 members). Social Democrats
have lost more than 30% of their members in the last
three years (now 13,500 members). The new radical right
Freedom and Direct Democracy is the only party that has
increased in membership, with a total of 4,500 members
since its establishment in 2015 (Rovensky, 2019).
Two new parties that are currently present in the
Czech parliament have stable but minimal member-
ship bases. ANO has 3,271 members; the Pirates report
approximately 1,000 members (Rovensky, 2019). While
similar in terms of extremely narrow membership base,
ANO and the Pirates have a diametrically different inter-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 473–484 479
nal organization. Pirates have robust internal democrat-
ic procedures, while ANO is a party of one man. The bil-
lionaire founder Andrej Babiš was reelected chair at the
party’s congress in February 2017 (95% of the votes) and
has ruled the party the same way he does his companies.
Babiš lent the ANO party a large sum of money, and his
company Agrofert—in trust—provides ANO accounting
and PR services (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). In 2017, ANO
changed its internal party rules and further strengthened
Andrej Babiš by giving him the right to intervene in select-
ing and ranking party candidates on candidates lists.
Civil society has a long tradition in the Czech Republic
and has historically played an essential role in the tran-
sition to democracy and keeping governments account-
able (Guasti, 2016, 2020a). The 2009 economic crisis act-
ed as a catalyst for citizen engagement in three respects.
First, it challenged civil society and trade unions to define
their relationship to the state; second, it highlighted
the need to communicate with the public and estab-
lish active ties between organized civil society and the
broader public, and third, it brought civil society clos-
er to private companies—both to ensure financial via-
bility but also to foster engagement (Guasti, 2020a).
In recent years number of new NGOs emerged focus-
ing on accountability (Reconstruction of the State, State
Watchman; cf. Guasti, 2020b).
Large scale protests marked the period of PM Babiš.
The most important initiative that has mobilized crowds
of the size unseen since 1989 is A Million Moments for
Democracy (MMD). Founded on the anniversary of the
Velvet Revolution on November 17, 2017, MMD was
launched on Facebook, and called for the Prime Minister
to meet his campaign pledge to develop democracy
(before the elections, Babiš mailed voters a letter offer-
ing a ‘new social contract’). When nothing happened, a
petition calling for Babiš to resign followed. Since April
2018, there has been an active protest campaign that
includes over 300 cities and villages.
From the onset, MMD and its leaders renounced
political ambition and signaled their support for
democratic political parties (explicitly rejecting the
Communists, radical right, and ANO). This is a double-
edged sword—it allows the MMD to be inclusive and
pluralistic, but limits its political impact. In June 2020, the
MMD, for the first time, met with leaders of five demo-
cratic political parties to discuss policy and urging the
opposition parties to overcome political fragmentation.
In sum, diagonal accountability has remained sta-
ble over the period under study (2013–2019), but is a
mixed bag. On the one hand, media freedom is increas-
ingly under attack. Established political parties are los-
ing membership at an accelerating speed, and new par-
ties without members (ANO, Pirates) currently control
over 42% of parliamentary seats. On the other hand, civic
engagement is growing, and protests prevented an ero-
sion of horizontal accountability. Andrej Babiš’s political
strategy relies on convincing people to remain passive,
leaving politics to the experts. However, it has failed to
curb participation and civil society (cf. Bernhard, 2020;
Bernhard et al., 2020).
5. Democratic Accountability During Covid-19
Pandemic
The Covid-19 pandemic represents a unique opportuni-
ty for the further deterioration of horizontal and diago-
nal accountability: Emergency measures strengthen the
executive, weaken parliamentary oversight (erosion of
horizontal accountability), and suspend certain rights
and liberties (erosion of diagonal accountability). Under
the pandemic state of emergency, technocratic populists
were less constrained than they were as junior part-
ners in PM Sobotka government (2013–2017) or while
leading PM Babiš minority government (2018–ongoing).
The strength and resilience of the institutional guardrails
and civil society are being tested (cf. Weyland, 2020).
In the first wave (February to July 2020), the Covid-19
response in the Czech Republic was technocratic—driven
by experts adopting swift and aggressive measures,
including the closure of borders, a travel ban (citizens
not allowed to leave the country), and compulsory masks
(Guasti, 2020a). As the critique of the government’s ini-
tially chaotic (and for some, illiberal) response mount-
ed, the PM backtracked to the standard emergency
response enabling the Minister of Interior (junior part-
ner in the government) to lead the emergency response
body (Guasti, 2020a). Nevertheless, even then, the acqui-
sition of the personal protection equipment (PPE) for
essential personnel continued as a form of political com-
petition between the coalition partners, while failing to
satisfy the demand for PPE. The cost of the populari-
ty contest between ANO and Social democrats was a
decrease in transparency, a rise in clientelism, and a loss
of trust. The backlash against the government’s handling
of the pandemic grew, but ANO support remained rela-
tively stable, deepening societal polarization. According
to some surveys ANO support started to deteriorate dur-
ing the late summer and especially in September 2020
during the onset of the second wave. However, ANO
remains the strongest party (Soukup, 2020).
Parliamentary oversight and investigative journal-
ism were crucial in identifying problems in the gov-
ernment response to Covid-19 (especially the purchase
of PPE from companies based in tax havens, rather
than domestic producers; the price of PPE). The gov-
ernment initially attempted to instrumentalize the pan-
demic to push through legislation benefiting the PM
(an amendment that would eliminate the PM’s con-
flict of interest by decreasing transparency in compa-
ny ownership). The media reported on the attempt and
explained the amendment’s implications. The opposi-
tion unified and pushed back against the government—
threatening not to reauthorize the state of emergency
if the government went ahead. The government with-
drew the bill. Similarly, when a group of senators pub-
licly announced their intention to bring the travel ban
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to the Constitutional Court for review, the government
abandoned the policy.
Perhaps the most significant legal pushback against
the government’s pandemic measures came from the
Prague municipal court. On April 21, 2020, the court
ruled that emergency measures, including limits on free-
dom of movement, the travel ban, and the compulso-
ry closure of large shops, were illegal. The ruling stip-
ulated that the government measures were arbitrary,
chaotic, and incomprehensible. The court explicitly high-
lighted the need to protect both the health of the peo-
ple and the health of democracy. The government was
provided one week to mitigate the situation and legal
recourse. After the President and the PM’s initial hesi-
tation and attempt to blame the court for endangering
public health, the government fully accepted the ruling
and amended the situation.
The chaotic Covid-19 response mobilized civil society.
In the initial phases of the pandemic, civil society mobi-
lized to produce home-made masks. As the state of emer-
gency ended and the country started to reopen, MMD
demanded accountability for the government’s Covid-19
response and called for anti-government demonstra-
tions in Prague and across the country for June 9, 2020.
The Minister of Health (ANO) accused MMD of under-
mining the Covid-19 response, called the protests “ille-
gal,” and demanded the Police prevent large gather-
ings (Guasti, 2020a). The Police responded uniquely—
reminding the Minister that its role is to protect peo-
ple’s constitutionally enshrined rights to protest. At the
same time, it is the responsibility of the public health
authorities to protect public health. MMD responded by
asking demonstrators to wear masks, respect distance,
and use hygienic precautions. The demonstration went
ahead and took place in Prague and 166 other munici-
palities across the country.
In sum, during the first wave of Covid-19 (February to
June 2020), the government’s technocratic competence
was tested, and its increased efforts to undermine hor-
izontal and diagonal accountability failed. During a pan-
demic, populist rhetoric cannot entirely obscure a lack
of competence. Parliamentary opposition exercised over-
sight by demanding re-authorization of the state of emer-
gency. Even if the Communists vetoed some parliamen-
tary hearings that would shed light on the government’s
chaotic pandemic response, investigative journalists pro-
vided information about gaps and mishaps. Prague’s
municipal court pushed back against some governmen-
tal measures, ensuring that the pandemic response did
not undermine democracy and the rule of law. Czech civ-
il society, universities, and startups were able to mitigate
the scarcity of PPE effectively and mobilized to defend
democracy and the rule of law simultaneously.
6. Conclusions
Previous studies have shown how populism in pow-
er erodes horizontal accountability in Latin America
(Ruth, 2018), and that diagonal accountability can pre-
vent democratic erosion (Bernhard, 2020; Bernhard
et al., 2015, 2020). The main findings of this article
are that technocratic populism has illiberal tendencies
expressed best in its efforts at executive aggrandize-
ment (cf. Bermeo, 2016). Without an effective bulwark
against democratic erosion (cf. Bernhard, 2015; Weyland,
2020), technocratic populism tends to undermine elec-
toral competition (vertical accountability), judiciary inde-
pendence, legislative oversight (horizontal accountabili-
ty), and freedom of the press (diagonal accountability).
The most effective checks on technocratic populist in
power, this study finds, are the courts, free media, and
civil society.
This article demonstrates that Andrej Babiš used his
political power to weaken his business opponents and
exploited his media power to weaken the senior coali-
tion partner (Social Democrats), maintaining support
by undermining parties on the left (Social democrats
and the Communists), with whom he governs. Over
the period under study, all three types of account-
ability eroded (horizontal accountability only between
2013–2017). However, the erosion of vertical and hori-
zontal accountability resulted from polarization and frag-
mentation that are conducive to, but not created by,
technocratic populism. Only the erosion of diagonal
accountability can be ascribed to the technocratic pop-
ulists (cf. Vachudova, 2019).
Babiš’s weaponization of private media led the Social
democrats and the opposition to unite and adopt party
finance regulations and a new law on conflicts of interest.
Still, Babiš continues his attack on diagonal accountabil-
ity, increasing pressure on state media (attempt at cap-
turing media oversight bodies). At the same time, state-
controlled companies represent the primary source of
advertisement revenue for MAFRA. Additional ANO
attempts to tamper with the court nomination proce-
dures have thus far failed (horizontal accountability).
Erosion of horizontal and diagonal accountability back-
fired and triggered large scale protests.
During the (first wave of the) Covid-19 pandemic,
Babiš’s government attempted to use broad emergen-
cy powers to aggrandize executive power (cf. Bermeo,
2016), weaken oversight, and ban protests (Guasti,
2020a). These attempts were dressed in the language
of technocratic competence and public health. However,
the courts and civil society largely withstood the pres-
sure. Public protest rejected the new social contract
of passivity and demanded accountability (cf. Bernhard,
2020; Bernhard et al., 2015, 2020). Nevertheless, ANO
remains the strongest party (cf. Soukup, 2020). While
protests are critical in a representative democracy,
elections are still the primary legitimation mechanism
(cf. Taggart, 2002). Populists in power have effective
tools to maintain voter support, including targeted poli-
cies (cf. Buštíková, 2019; Buštíková & Baboš, 2020).
Covid-19 presented a unique opportunity for tech-
nocratic populists in power to the erode horizontal and
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diagonal accountability. Faced with the pandemic, tech-
nocratic promises are being tested. Covid-19 outlines the
limits of both the technocratic populism and civil society
resilience. Opposition, courts, and civil society have been
effective at preventing further democratic decay, but the
second wave of the pandemic will present new tests.
This article’s contribution is three-fold—for the study
of populism, democratic backsliding, and polarization.
For the study of populism, it outlines the inherent ten-
sion between technocratic populism and liberal democ-
racy. For technocratic populism, democracy is a selec-
tion procedure for a leader. Technocratic populism, like
its left- and right-wing counterparts, opposes the mutu-
al constraints inhibiting absolute power in a democra-
cy (Huber & Schimpf, 2017, pp. 149–152; cf. Zulianello,
2020 on varieties of populist parties and their system
integration). Nevertheless, unlike left- and right-wing
populists, which often support majoritarian measures
such as referenda (cf. Urbinati, 2014), technocratic pop-
ulists seek passivity or introduce top down innovations
(Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; Perottino & Guasti, 2020).
The people are perceived as capable of selecting the
leader, but only the leader and experts can gauge
the general will and common interest (Caramani, 2017;
cf. Rosanvallon, 2011).
For the democratic backsliding literature, this arti-
cle highlights the mechanisms of democratic decay
and democratic resilience beyond electoral politics
(cf. Buštíková & Guasti, 2017). It indicates that a combi-
nation of institutional veto points and civil society agency
is necessary to prevent democratic erosion (cf. Weyland,
2020). The legitimacy of technocratic populism is in out-
put, so pandemics test the technocratic promise of com-
petence. When competence fails (to maintain support),
technocratic populists have turned to more targeted
social policies (cf. Buštíková & Baboš, 2020).
For the study of polarization, this article shows that
under proportional electoral systems, fragmentation can
be conducive to maintaining the status quo, for it not
only inhibits the opposition from reversing the status
quo but also prevents technocratic populists from turn-
ing an illiberal swerve into an illiberal turn (cf. Buštíková
& Guasti, 2017). While active civil society can prevent
democratic erosion (Bernhard, 2020), it cannot reverse
it. Without unified political opposition, civil society can
maintain the status quo, but not to bring about change.
Ultimately, the future of liberal democracy depends
on the people’s willingness to defend it in the streets
AND at the ballot box. At the moment, two opposing
projects polarize the Czech Republic—technocratic pop-
ulism (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019; Lorenz & Formánková,
2020; cf. Manin, 1997) versus liberal democracy with
active citizens and civil society.
In times of populism, anti-establishment and anti-
elite delegitimization strategies are critical (Aprasidze
& Siroky, 2020; Buštíková & Guasti, 2019; Castaldo &
Verzichelli, 2020), and particular attention ought to be
paid to the effect of populism in power on democra-
cy (Caiani & Graziano, 2019; Kaltwasser, 2012, 2014).
Populists seek to reframe political competition while sti-
fling horizontal, vertical, and especially diagonal account-
ability (cf. Ruth-Lovell et al., 2019). Future research
would benefit from further comparing the effects of pop-
ulisms (left-, right-, technocratic) in power on account-
ability, thereby advancing our understanding of the
tradeoffs between the positive and negative effects
of populism.
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